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LAWYERS WRITE TREATIES, 
ENGINEERS BUILD DIKES, GODS OF 
WEATHER IGNORE BOTH: MAKING 
TRANSBOUNDARY WATERS 
AGREEMENTS RELEVANT, FLEXIBLE, 
AND RESILIENT IN A TIME OF 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
GLEN HEARNS & RICHARD KYLE PAISLEY* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article identifies and critically reviews the importance of 
adaptability and flexibility in treaties and institutional arrangements by 
providing resilience in the face of the anticipated impact of climate 
change on the good governance of international waters.1 Building greater 
 
*Glen Hearns and Richard Kyle Paisley, Global Transboundary International Waters Governance 
Initiative, University of British Columbia, Institute for Asian Research, Vancouver, Canada. The 
authors gratefully acknowledge the support and encouragement of a wide range of individuals and 
institutions too numerous to mention by name, including through a Global Environment Facility 
project entitled Good Practices and Portfolio Learning in GEF Transboundary Freshwater and 
Marine Legal and Institutional Frameworks. This three-year multi-donor project is dedicated to 
facilitating good governance and more effective decisionmaking in international waters through the 
identification, collection, adaptation and replication of beneficial practices and lessons learned from 
international experiences. The project also facilitates dialogue among individuals and organizations 
engaged in governance within, and between, freshwater, groundwater and marine international 
waters, with particular emphasis on “South-South” cooperation and learning. The key measurable 
benefit of the project is in ensuring that various lessons learned from multi-country experiences, 
including identification of areas where problems and delays are commonly experienced, are 
assimilated by various target audiences in a meaningful way through experiential learning. These 
target audiences include local water managers, governments, civil society groups, academics, and the 
portfolio of Global Environment Facility projects. The authors particularly gratefully acknowledge 
the support, encouragement, and research skills of our colleague Taylor Henshaw, without which 
this article would not have been possible. 
 1 Six critical aspects of good governance are benefit sharing, information exchange, 
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resilience and adaptability into international waters agreements is 
essential to address the uncertainties in hydrological and ocean processes 
associated with climate change.2 There is also growing consensus that 
conflict over natural resources can be linked to extreme events and 
climate change,3 and this is receiving increased attention in foreign 
policy development.4 Surface water resources are especially vulnerable 
to the anticipated consequences of climate change, due to the strong 
linkage surface water resources have with precipitation and temperature.5 
Other international waters such as international large marine ecosystems 
and international groundwater resources are also potentially impacted by 
climate change events.6 Climate change and adaptation need to be at the 
forefront of water policy. Technical solutions, such as dams, are 
important elements in strategies to deal with climate change; however, 
they have their limitations.7 At the core of successful adaptation will be 
institutions that are designed and maintained with the flexibility and 
capacity to develop and implement innovative and adaptive strategies to 
mitigate the impacts of climate change. 
In this Article, “international waters” are water resources that are 
shared by two or more sovereign states. They include international 
freshwater, international groundwater, and international Large Marine 
resolving disputes, institutional design, flexibility and adaptability, and sustainable financing. See 
INT’L WATERS INITIATIVE, UNIV. OF B.C., PROJECT DOCUMENTS—GOOD PRACTICES AND 
PORTFOLIO LEARNING IN GEF TRANSBOUNDARY FRESHWATER AND MARINE LEGAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS, available at governance-iwlearn.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/08/GEFbrochureOct2009.pdf. 
 2 The difference between weather and climate is a measure of time. Weather refers to 
conditions of the atmosphere over a short period of time (hours or months), and climate is how the 
atmosphere “behaves” over relatively long periods of time (multi-year). See What’s the Difference 
Between Weather and Climate?, NAT’L AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMIN. (Feb. 1, 2005), 
www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/noaa-n/climate/climate_weather.html. 
 3 Géraud de Ville, Climate Change – Bad News for Environmental Security, 10 ENVTL. L. 
REV. 175, 175 (2008) (U.K.). 
 4 KURT M. CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AGE OF CONSEQUENCES: THE FOREIGN POLICY AND 
NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL CHANGE 10 (2007). 
 5 Nigel W. Arnell, Effects of IPCC SRES Emissions Scenarios on River Runoff: A Global 
Perspective, 7 HYDROLOGY & EARTH SYS. SCI. 619 (2003) (Ger.). 
 6 The effects of climate alterations on fisheries have been acknowledged for decades. 
However, the extent and rapidity of the impact appear to be accelerating, based on marked changes 
in trophic structure as well as shifts in latitude and depth of fisheries. See Allison Perry et al., 
Climate Change and Distribution Shifts in Marine Fisheries, 308 SCI. 1912, 1912-15 (2005). 
Recharge of groundwater systems is affected both by river flow and precipitation and is thus heavily 
influenced by alterations in climate. See Z.W. Kundzewicz et al., The Implications of Projected 
Climate Change for Freshwater Resources and Their Management, 53 HYDROLOGICAL SCI. J. 3, 3-
10 (2008) (U.K.). 
 7 WATER AND CLIMATE CHANGE: HOW TO DEVELOP AN ADAPTATION STRATEGY IN 
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Ecosystems (LMEs).8 Included in the definition of international waters 
are “boundary” water resources where the boundary between two or 
more sovereign states is formed by an international lake or river. The 
definition further includes “successive” water resources where an 
international river (or underground aquifer) flows from one sovereign 
state to another. 
International waters are critically important. Nearly half of the 
world’s population is located within one or more of the over 260 
international freshwater drainage basins alone that are shared by two or 
more sovereign states.9 Even more striking than the absolute number of 
international freshwater drainage basins is a breakdown of each 
sovereign nation’s land surface that falls within those drainage basins.10 
There are 145 nations that include territory within international 
freshwater drainage basins. Of the thirty-three countries that have greater 
than ninety-five percent of their territory within international freshwater 
drainage basins, twenty-one lie in their entirety within them. There are 
nineteen international freshwater drainage basins that are shared by five 
or more riparian countries. The Danube is by far the most complex, with 
eighteen nations in its drainage basin. The Congo, Niger, Nile, Rhine, 
and Zambezi drainage basins are each shared by between nine and eleven 
countries; the remaining thirteen international freshwater drainage basins 
each have between five and eight riparian countries.11 
This Article accepts the proposition that current climate predictions 
are largely correct and that there will be greater variability in 
precipitation, with a general trend at higher latitudes and elevations of 
greater precipitation in the wet season and reduced precipitation in the 
dry season.12 This Article argues there is an urgent need to design and 
 8 See SUSTAINING THE WORLD’S LARGE MARINE ECOSYSTEMS iii (Kenneth Sherman et al. 
eds., 2009), available at www.lme.noaa.gov/lmeweb/downloads/book_sustain.pdf. LMEs are 
regions of ocean space of 200,000 square kilometers or more, which encompass coastal areas from 
river basins to estuaries to the outer margins of a continental shelf or the seaward extent of a 
predominant coastal current. LMEs are defined by ecological criteria, including bathymetric, 
hydrographic, productivity and trophically linked populations. Id. 
 9 Aaron Wolf et al., International River Basins of the World, 15 INT’L J. WATER RES. DEV. 
387, 391 (1999) (U.K.), available at 
www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/register/register_paper.html. 
 10 Id. at 421. 
 11 Id. at 392. 
 12 Climate models vary between the extent of alterations of temperature and precipitation; 
however, in general most agree that higher latitudes and higher elevations (such as the Himalayan 
mountains) will experience greater overall precipitation in the precipitation season, which may lead 
to increased incidence of flooding. Conversely, the traditional dry seasons are expected to 
experience less precipitation in the drier seasons increasing the risk of droughts. There are less clear 
trends closer to the equator and in arid zones, which are anticipated to experience greater changes in 
precipitation in general. See Arnell, supra note 5, at 640; see also Vivek Arora & George Boer, 
Effects of Simulated Climate Change on the Hydrology of Major River Basins, 106 J. GEOPHYSICAL 
3
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implement institutional arrangements to deal specifically with these 
challenges.13 The Article focuses on the structure of arrangements to deal 
with or accommodate changes associated with climate change. 
Over the past century an increasing number of transboundary water 
agreements have been developed. The majority of these agreements deal 
largely with infrastructure development and water allocation, either 
directly through irrigation or indirectly through timing, such as holding 
water back during the summer to provide power in the winter.14 
Regrettably, few of these agreements establish institutional structures 
that have the intrinsic capacity to adapt to changes in the hydrologic 
regime through phenomena such as climate change.15 Existing 
institutional arrangements need to be critically reviewed to determine 
whether they are resilient in the face of extreme climate events or 
whether they fail to meet the challenge of adaptation. This is of 
paramount importance in the developing world. However, member 
countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD)16 are similarly vulnerable to the deleterious 
consequences and potential impacts of climate change. For example, it is 
questionable whether many of the existing water compacts covering the 
southwestern United States would withstand alterations associated with 
climate change scenarios.17 
Although the study of resilience and adaptability of international 
legal arrangements is relatively new, a recent analysis of the Orange-
Senqu River Commission indicates it is resilient and adaptive to the 
challenges of climate change.18 The authors assessed various agreements 
RES. ATMOSPHERES 3335, 3335 (2001); see also Kundzewicz et al., supra note 6, at 5. 
 13 Scholars have also argued that many of water managers’ assumptions, upon which water 
agreements have been developed, are no longer valid. See A. Dan Tarlock, How Well Can Water 
Law Adapt to the Potential Stresses of Global Climate Change?, in NORTHWESTERN LAW 
COLLOQUIUM SERIES—ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1-2 (2012), available at 
www.law.northwestern.edu/colloquium/environmental/documents/Spring2012_Tarlock.pdf.  
 14 See generally International Freshwater Treaties Database, OR. STATE UNIV., 
www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/interfreshtreatdata.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
The database provides access to treaties from 1820 to present. Treaties have been categorized based 
on the terms in the treaties. There have been more treaties associated with quantity and infrastructure 
than other categories. Id. 
 15 Meredith A. Giordano & Aaron T. Wolf, Sharing Waters: Post –Rio International Water 
Management, 27 NATURAL RES. FORUM 163, 169 (2003). 
 16 See History, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., www.oecd.org/about/history/ (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2013). OECD was founded in 1961 to stimulate economic growth and trade. As of 
2013, it has thirty-four members that are high-income economies and have high Human 
Development Index ratings. Members include most European countries, NAFTA members, 
Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Chile. Id. 
 17 Stephen E. Draper & James E. Kundell, Impact of Climate Change on Transboundary 
Water Sharing, 133 J. WATER RES. PLAN. & MGMT. 405, 413 (2007). 
 18 The Orange-Senqu River Commission was established through an agreement between the 
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within the basin from 1983 to the creation of the Commission in 2000 in 
terms of use of allocation strategies, drought response provisions, ability 
to amend or review the process, revocation clauses, and institutional 
responsibilities such as data gathering and decisionmaking.19 They 
conclude that the existing agreements contain mechanisms to promote 
adaptability, the most important of which are the institutional structures 
and mandates of the basin organizations.20 These allow for flexibility in 
managing the water resources, including their use of adaptive 
management. 
However, many other international drainage basins currently lack 
the institutional flexibility and capacity to deal with anticipated changes 
due to climate change. The Indus River is a prime example of a basin 
that will be significantly challenged by climate change. The rivers of the 
Indus basin flow from Tibet into India and then Pakistan through 
Kashmir. Under the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT),21 Pakistan has control 
over the three western rivers and India has control over the three eastern 
rivers.22 The IWT calls for the exchange of hydrographical information 
and the optimum development of the rivers, and it expresses a future 
intention to cooperate to the fullest possible extent.23 However, the 
reality is that the countries manage “their” rivers as sole sovereigns.24 
Republic of Botswana, the Kingdom of Lesotho, the Republic of Namibia, and the Republic of South 
Africa for the establishment of the Orange-Senqu River Commission, signed at Windhoek, Nov. 3, 
2000. The institutional structure and operations of the commission itself have been considered as 
being adaptive and responsive to climate change. See Elizabeth J. Kistin & Peter J. Ashton, Adapting 
to Change on Transboundary Rivers: An Analysis of Treaty Flexibility on the Orange-Senqu River 
Basin, 24 INT’L J. WATER RES. DEV. 3, 14 (2008) (U.K.), available at 
www.orangesenqurak.com/UserFiles/File/OtherV2/Adapting%20to%20Change%20on%20Transbou
ndary%20Rivers%20CSIR%202008.pdf. The Commission has also been assessed as having 
promoted the concepts of integrated water resource management (IWRM) and adaptive management 
of water resources throughout the region. However, there are serious concerns that there is limited 
capacity within the institutions to actually implement such as management objectives. See NICOLE 
KRANZ & RODRIGO VIDAURRE, NEW APPROACHES TO ADAPTIVE WATER MGMT. UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY, INSTITUTION-BASED WATER REGIME ANALYSIS ORANGE-SENQU BASIN 13 (2008), 
available at www.newater.uni-osnabrueck.de/intern/sendfile.php?id=1199. 
 19 Kistin & Ashton, supra note 18, at 6. There are seven international agreements in the 
Orange-Senqu basin that address water management. These agreements include project-specific 
agreements, water sharing, and the development of management institutions, culminating in the 
creation of the Orange-Senqu River Commission in 2000. 
 20 Kistin & Ashton, supra note 18, at 14. 
 21 The Indus Waters Treaty between the Government of India, the Government of Pakistan, 
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Sept. 19, 1960, 419 U.N.T.S. 12 
[hereinafter Indus Treaty]. 
 22 Id. Under Article 2, India has virtually complete control of the three Eastern Rivers, Sutbji, 
Beas, and Ravi, while Article 3 gives Pakistan control of the Western Rivers, Indus, Chenab, and 
Jhelum. 
 23 Id. at art. 6-7. 
 24 While the Indus Treaty calls for cooperation and exchange of data, there is a very low 
level of cooperation and data exchange. See N. Kliot et al., Institutions for Management of 
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For more than forty-five years this “hands-off” approach avoided open 
conflict. However, recent Indian plans to develop hydro-power and 
irrigation projects on “Pakistan’s rivers” have raised significant concerns 
in Pakistan.25 Dam development in India, often perceived in Islamabad to 
negatively affect Pakistan, has been increasingly prominent over the past 
decade.26 Most recently, India has been seen to be avoiding renewing 
talks with Pakistan regarding the Wullar Barrage on the Jhelum River, 
which India initiated in 1985 and stopped two years later over official 
protests from Pakistan.27 The arrangement of passive cooperation, or 
tolerance of each other, as laid out in the IWT, is insufficient to meet the 
challenges of the future. A significantly more nuanced approach that 
focuses on the mutual gains that are available to both countries is needed 
to optimize the Indus’s waters in the face of climate change.28 A more 
active or mutual cooperation, such as that encountered in the Columbia 
River, is needed to optimize the waters of the Indus as climate change 
and increasing demand place pressure on resources.29 
While the Indus may be an extreme situation, it is by no means an 
isolated one. The Ganges-Brahmaputra, Han, Incomati, Kunene, Kura-
Araks, Lake Chad, La Plata, Lempa, Limpopo, Mekong, Ob (Ertis), 
Okavango, Orange, Salween, Senegal, Tumen, and Zambezi basins have 
Transboundary Water Resources: Their Nature, Characteristics and Shortcomings, 3 WATER POL’Y 
229, 243 (2001) (U.K.). 
 25 Reports from Pakistani newspapers in March 2012 indicated that in addition to already 
building fourteen dams including a hydro-power dam, the Government of India was intending take a 
portion of the Chenab River to irrigate lands in the area of Jammu. See Khalid Mustafa, India Plans 
To Use Chenab To Irrigate Jammu Land, NEWS INT’L (Pak.), Mar. 13, 2012; see also Wajiha Butt, 
Stealing of Chenab, PAK. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2012. 
 26 Zafar Bhutta, Water Wars: Wullar Barrage Set To Figure in Pak-India Talks, EXPRESS 
TRIB. (Pak.), Aug. 30, 2012; see also Zahid Milak, Is Pakistan Ready for Water Wars, PAK. 
OBSERVER, Mar. 15, 2010. Major Indian projects that have been protested by Pakistan as not 
complying with the Indus Water Treaty include the Baglihar dam, the Kishanganga dam, the Nimo 
Bazgo dam, Salal, Wullar, Dul Hasti, and Uri Il. See also Shaheen Akhtar, Emerging Challenges to 
IWT: Issues of Compliance and Transboundary Impacts of Indian Hydro Projects on the Western 
Rivers, 28 REGIONAL STUD., 3, 30 (2010) (Pak.). 
 27 India has long had plans to increase the storage capacity of the Wullar Lake on the Jhelum 
River to increase navigation. See Bhutta, supra note 26. 
 28 Alex Grzybowski et al., Beyond International Water Law: Successfully Negotiating 
Mutual Gains Agreements for International Watercourses, 22 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & 
DEV. L. J. 139 (2010); see also Glen Hearns, Analysis of Process: Mechanisms Promoting 
Cooperation in Transboundary Waters 17 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Univ. of B.C.) (on 
file with Univ. of B.C.), available at circle.ubc.ca/handle/2429/28367 [hereinafter Promoting 
Cooperation]. 
 29 The Indus Treaty is considered an agreement promoting “passive cooperation.” This is in 
stark contrast to the situation in the Columbia River, where the operation of dams in both Canada 
and the United States are highly integrated, optimizing flood control and power generation as well 
taking into consideration other interests such as recreation and fisheries. See Promoting 
Cooperation, supra note 28, at 83. 
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all been identified as basins with a significant potential for conflict 
exacerbated by climate change.30 
II. THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE 
Climate change is expected to have a profound and devastating 
effect on life as we now know it. According to the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe: 
Climate change will result in significant impacts on our water 
resources and some of the effects are already visible now. Nearly all 
countries [in Europe] are expected to be negatively affected by 
impacts ranging from increased frequency and intensity of floods and 
droughts, worsening water scarcity, intensified erosion and 
sedimentation, reductions in glaciers and snow cover, sea level rise, 
and damage to water quality and ecosystems. Moreover, climate 
change impacts on water resources will have cascading effects on 
human health and many parts of the economy and society, as various 
sectors are directly dependent on water.31 
There is controversy over the causes of climate change.32 However, 
there is emerging consensus that climate change is affecting marine 
currents, hydraulic regimes, and temperatures.33 Climate models predict 
different magnitudes of change in different locations. However, climate 
change models generally envisage extreme variability of weather in the 
upcoming decades.34 In terms of terrestrial ecosystems, many arid areas 
will experience reduced water availability due to increased evaporation 
and limited dry seasons.35 Temperate regions will experience reduced 
summer precipitation and more rains in wet seasons.36 Of great concern 
in many parts of the world, particularly Central and South Asia, is the 
 30 Aaron T. Wolf et al., International Waters: Identifying Basins at Risk, 5 WATER POL’Y 29, 
47 (2003) (U.K.). 
 31 UNITED NATIONS ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR., GUIDANCE ON WATER AND ADAPTATION TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE, at iii (2009), available at 
www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/publications/documents/Guidance_water_climate.pdf. 
 32 IAN PLIMER, HEAVEN AND EARTH: GLOBAL WARMING, THE MISSING SCIENCE (2009). 
 33 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Climate Change 2007: Synthesis 
Report 2 (Nov. 12-17, 2007), available at www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf. 
 34 Arora & Boer, supra note 12, at 3343-44; see also Nigel W. Arnell, Climate Change and 
Global Water Resources: SRES Emissions and Socio-economic Scenarios, 14 GLOBAL ENVTL. 
CHANGE 31 (2004) (U.K.); S. Manabe et al., Century-Scale Change in Water Availability: CO2-
Quadrupling Experiment, 64 CLIMATIC CHANGE 59, 65 (2004) (Neth.), available at 
www.gfdl.noaa.gov/bibliography/related_files/sm0401.pdf. 
 35 Manabe et al., supra note 34, at 75. 
 36 Manabe et al., supra note 34, at 70. 
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loss of glaciers and snowfields, which have historically acted as natural 
reservoirs by releasing water in the dry season.37 
A review of flows in the Ganges River Basin over the last decade 
illustrates the potential impact of increased extreme weather and climate 
conditions. During the monsoon period in 1998, Bangladesh experienced 
one of the most devastating floods in history, covering two thirds of the 
country and severely affecting the rice harvest.38 In response, the United 
Nations World Food Programme launched one of the largest food relief 
operations in its history.39 Six months later the country was ravaged by 
the worst drought in half a century, which also impacted food 
production.40 In 1996, India and Bangladesh signed an agreement over 
the operation of the Farakka Barrage to divert water from the Ganges 
away from Bangladesh to regulate flow into Calcutta.41 After the 
extreme flooding in 2006, however, came a drought and Bangladesh 
accused India of not releasing sufficient water at Farakka.42 However, a 
few months later Bangladesh experienced flooding again, as gates of the 
barrage were torn away by high water.43 This alternating between severe 
flooding and drought is hampering development in one of the lowest per-
capita-income countries in the world. Climate change predictions for the 
Ganges basin anticipate slightly increased annual flows, with reduced dry 
season volumes and greatly increased flooding during the wet season.44 
Climate change may also strongly influence the distribution and 
abundance of marine resources and fisheries.45 More specifically, climate 
 37 UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ORG., WATER: A SHARED 
RESPONSIBILITY: THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2, at 125 (2006), 
available at unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001444/144409E.pdf. 
 38 CARLO DEL NINNO ET AL., INT’L FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INST., THE 1998 FLOODS IN 
BANGLADESH: DISASTER IMPACTS, HOUSEHOLD COPING STRATEGIES, AND RESPONSE, at xv (2001). 
 39 Bangladesh Drought Threatens Rice Crop, BBC NEWS SERV., Apr. 4, 1999, 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/311769.stm. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of Bangladesh on Sharing of the Ganga/Ganges Waters at Farakka, Bangl.-India, 
Dec. 12, 1996, available at 
www.ssvk.org/koshi/reports/treaty_on_farakka_india_bangladesh_4_ganga_river_water.pdf 
[hereinafter Sharing of the Ganga/Ganges Treaty]; see also Salman M.A. Salman & Kishor Uprety, 
Hydro-Politics in South Asia: A Comparative Analysis of the Mahakali and Ganges Treaties, 39 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 295, 304 (1999). 
 42 Bangladesh Accuses India of Not Releasing Ganga Water, INDIO-ASIAN NEWS SERV. 
(India), Apr. 4, 2006. 
 43 Farakka Lock Gate Washed Away, STATESMAN (India), Feb. 22, 2007, available at 
www.thestatesman.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=181283:Farakka%20lock
%20gate%20washed%20away&catid=35:page-one&from_page=search. 
 44 Arora & Boer, supra note 12, at 3344. 
 45 M. Aaron MacNeil et al., Transitional States in Marine Fisheries: Adapting to Predicted 
Global Change, 365 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y B 3753, 3754 (2010) 
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change is expected to lead to: 
 
1. Yield and species losses in tropical reef fisheries due to habitat loss, 
 
2. Community turnover in temperate fisheries owing to increasing 
transition from cold-water species to warm-water species, and 
 
3. Increased diversity and yield in Arctic fisheries arising from the 
arrival of southern species combined with increased primary production 
resulting from ice-free summer conditions.46 
 
Climate changes will undoubtedly alter many of our natural 
resource systems in ways that we have little experience with to date. 
“How societies deal with such changes will depend largely on their 
capacity to adapt—to plan and implement effective responses to 
change—a process heavily influenced by social, economic, political and 
cultural conditions.”47 
Climate change is also accompanied by increased pollution, as well 
as increased demand for water resources.48 The convergence of these 
factors will increasingly challenge conventional approaches to water 
resource management.49 
Societies with highly adaptive capacities in institutional, political, 
and socio-economic terms will be more resilient to future changes. More 
than a decade of work by Aaron Wolf and his research team at Oregon 
State University shows that extremes of both cooperation and aggression 
over water are seen in marginalised climates such as arid and semi-arid 
regions.50 This research indicates that neither conflict nor cooperation are 
conclusively determined by factors like water scarcity or water sharing. 
They are, however, exacerbated by those factors.51 Tension is created 
(U.K.). 
 46 Id. at 3753. 
 47 Id. 
 48 DAVID SECKLER ET AL., INT’L WATER MGMT. INST., WORLD WATER DEMAND AND 
SUPPLY, 1990 TO 2025: SCENARIOS AND ISSUES, at 16 (1998), available at 
www.iwmi.cgiar.org/Publications/IWMI_Research_Reports/PDF/PUB019/REPORT19.PDF; 
Charles J. Vörösmarty et al., Global Water Resources: Vulnerability from Climate Change and 
Population Growth, 289 SCI. 284, 287 (2000); see also UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCIENTIFIC & 
CULTURAL ORG., supra note 37, at 6. 
 49 W. Neil Adger et al., Adaptation to Climate Change in the Developing World, 3 PROGRESS 
DEV. STUD., 179, 190 (2003); Claudia Pahl-Wostl, Transitions Towards Adaptive Management of 
Water Facing Climate and Global Change, 21 WATER RESOURCE MGMT. 49, 51 (2007) (Neth.). 
 50 Aaron T. Wolf et al., Conflict and Cooperation Within International River Basins: The 
Importance of Institutional Capacity, 125 WATER RESOURCES UPDATE 1, 5 (2003), available at 
www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/abst_docs/Wolf_2003.pdf. 
 51 Of note is the work of Nils Petter Gelditsch and his team of researchers at the International 
9
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when the speed of change exceeds the ability of institutions to mitigate 
that change.52 The most common ways that countries alter international 
drainage basins are through changes in the quantity and quality of water 
at any given time. Quality is primarily affected by pollution, which can 
be industrial, as in the case of the Rhine,53 or agricultural, as in the case 
of the Rio Grande and Colorado rivers.54Altered quantity of flow can 
also be affected through climate variability, creation of storage facilities, 
and large-scale extractions.55 
Social, political, and economic factors may be more influential in 
basins than those of climate change. The work of Charles Vörösmarty 
and others indicates that population growth and increasing individual 
consumption will have a greater impact on water resource scarcity than 
that induced by climate change.56 Moreover, Clionadh Raleigh, in her 
examination of climate-induced conflict, determined that population 
growth and density are strongly correlated with increased risks of 
conflict.57 In assessing local resource management systems’ relationship 
to conflict, Raleigh concluded that the effects of political and economic 
factors outweighed environmental effects.58 Political, social, economic, 
and environmental interdependencies need to be considered when 
Peace Research Institute’s Centre for the Study of Civil War in Oslo, Norway. They have conducted 
statistical studies showing that countries sharing transboundary waters are more likely to enter into 
violent conflict with one another than those that do not. Furthermore, the risk of conflict increases as 
the amount of shared waters between the states increases. However, in conducting the research they 
did not measure degrees of cooperation but rather focused on conflict measurement. See Nils Petter 
Gleditsch et al., Conflicts over Shared Rivers: Resource Wars of Fuzzy Boundaries, 25 POL. 
GEOGRAPHY 361, 361-382 (2006). According to Wolf, the record of acute conflict over international 
water is overwhelmed by the record of cooperation. See Aaron T. Wolf, Shared Waters: Conflict and 
Cooperation, 32 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 3.1, 3.7 (2007) [hereinafter Conflict and 
Cooperation]. 
 52 Wolf et al., supra note 30, at 43. 
 53 The Rhine is a highly industrialized river suffering from various types of pollution, one of 
the most notable being chloride compounds. See Thomas Bernauer & Peter Moser, Reducing 
Pollution of the River Rhine: The Influence of International Cooperation, 5 J. ENV’T & DEV. 389, at 
392 (1996). 
 54 The Rio Grande and Colorado rivers in Mexico experience pollution due to upstream 
agricultural use. As greater quantities of water are used in irrigation, greater levels of salt are left in 
existing water, even to the point of rendering the water unusable. See Alberto Szekely, Emerging 
Boundary Environmental Challenges and Institutional Issues: Mexico and the United States, 33 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 33, 39 (1993). 
 55 The major causes of rapid change in hydrological systems are associated with climate 
variability, see UNITED NATIONS ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR., supra note 31, at iii; dams or storage 
facilities that contain water, see Wolf et al., supra note 30, at 44; and large-scale extractions, e.g., for 
irrigation, see Conflict and Cooperation, supra note 51, at 3.8. 
 56 Vörösmarty et al., supra note 48, at 287. 
 57 Clionadh Raleigh & Henrik Urdal, Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and 
Armed Conflict, 26 POL. GEOGRAPHY 674, 691 (2007). 
 58 Id. at 674. 
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assessing something as complex as the nature of conflict. For example, 
Thomas Homer-Dixon has argued that while not directly responsible for 
conflict, increasing water scarcity will indirectly enable conflict through 
secondary political and socio-economic destabilization.59 Homer-Dixon 
does not accept the notion that wars would be specifically fought over 
water, but he believes that conflict would be much more complex where 
resource scarcity undermines socio-economic stability and political 
interests and thus leads to increased tension.60 
Whether it is economic instability created in one state through dam 
building, or whether it is altered precipitation patterns due to climate 
change, the effectiveness and flexibility of institutional arrangements to 
adapt to change will arguably determine whether a basin falls into 
conflict or rises to cooperation in times of water stress.61 The Indus River 
valley is a case of institutional arrangements failing to adapt to change. 
Instead of increased cooperation in the face of increased demand and 
altering hydrology, we see increased unilateral action and increased 
tension as a result. Rather than setting up greater institutional linkage, the 
Indus Treaty separated management of a number of shared tributaries by 
allocating three to India and three to Pakistan.62 This state of hydro-
political “tolerance,” as opposed to hydro-political cooperation, has 
persisted since the Indus Treaty was signed in 1960.63 While the 
agreement has survived numerous hostilities between the countries,64 it is 
becoming increasingly evident that India’s development of dams on 
certain tributaries, which Pakistan claims affects its share of the Indus 
waters, is increasing hydro-political tensions in the region.65 The more 
water India diverts upstream, the less water is available for Pakistan 
downstream.66 
 59 For example, while the unrest of the occupied territories in the early 1990s was related to 
political, economic, and ideological factors, it is reasonable to conclude that water scarcity and its 
consequent economic effects contributed to the grievances behind the intifada. See Thomas Homer-
Dixon, Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases, 19 INT’L SECURITY 5, 
14 (1994). 
 60 Thomas Homer-Dixon, The Ingenuity Gap: Can Poor Countries Adapt to Resource 
Scarcity, 21 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 587 (1995); see also Erik Mostert, Conflict and Co-operation 
in International Freshwater Management: A Global Review, 1 INT’L J. RIVER BASIN MGMT. 1, 2 
(2003) (U.K.). 
 61 Promoting Cooperation, supra note 28, at 53. 
 62 See Indus Treaty, supra note 21. 
 63 Id. 
 64 India and Pakistan have a longstanding territorial dispute over the Kashmir region. 
Relations reached a low after India tested its nuclear weapons on May 11 and May 13, 1998. See 
India and Pakistan: Tense Neighbours, BBC NEWS SERV., Dec. 16, 2001, 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/102201.stm. 
 65 Butt, supra note 25; Milak, supra note 26. 
 66 Akhtar, supra note 26, at 2. 
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In contrast to the Indus, the Danube Basin is a case in which strong 
institutional development turned a potentially confrontational situation 
into one of cooperation. The Danube is Europe’s second longest river 
and drains from Germany to the Black Sea. The basin contains more than 
eighty million inhabitants spread over eighteen countries.67 The river is 
important for a variety of uses, including hydropower, navigation, 
industrial cooling, waste disposal, irrigation, and drinking water.68 
Fisheries are also important sources of income and food for downstream 
countries, and tourism is important especially for the local economies of 
the Danube Delta and the Black Sea.69 Water quality and conservation, 
primarily in terms of ecological functioning, have been severely affected 
due to pollution and alterations to the hydrological regime associated 
with storage and diversion facilities.70 
Formal transboundary institutional development regarding the 
Danube has developed in two major areas: navigation and environmental 
protection. Navigation has been an important issue on the Danube from 
as early as 1856, when a navigation commission for the Danube was 
created.71 A more recent agreement, signed in 1948 and ratified the 
following year, created a new Danube Commission for navigation.72 The 
1948 Danube Commission limited free navigation to only those riparian 
countries and reduced the power of the commission to govern legislation 
and river inspection.73 
Transboundary agreements on development occurred in the Danube 
basin throughout the 1950s and 1960s. However, these were 
predominantly bilateral in nature.74 Despite a predominant focus on 
development, multilateral discussions on anti-pollution issues were 
 67 The basin includes all of Hungary, most of Austria, Croatia, Romania, Slovenia and 
Slovakia, and significant portions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Germany, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro, and Ukraine. Also, small portions of Albania, Italy, 
Macedonia, Poland, and Switzerland are included in the basin. See Andrea K. Gerlak, Strengthening 
River Basin Institutions: The Global Environment Facility and the Danube River Basin, 40 WATER 
RESOURCES RES. 1, 3 (2004). 
 68 Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer & Susan Murcott, The Danube River Basin: International 
Cooperation or Sustainable Development, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 521, 524 (1996) [hereinafter 
Cooperation or Sustainable Development]; Joanne Linnerooth, The Danube River Basin: 
Negotiating Settlements to Transboundary Environmental Issues, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 629, 633 
(1990) [hereinafter Negotiating Settlements]. 
 69 Cooperation or Sustainable Development, supra note 68, at 524. 
 70 Negotiating Settlements, supra note 68, at 630. 
 71 In 1856, the Treaty of Paris established the European Danube Commission and provided 
for free navigation on the Danube. See Ralph Johnson, Freedom of Navigation for International 
Rivers: What Does It Mean?, 62 MICH. L. REV. 465, 470 (1964). 
 72 Convention Concerning the Regime of Navigation on the Danube, Aug. 18, 1948, 33 
U.N.T.S. 518. 
 73 Negotiating Settlements, supra note 68, at 632. 
 74 Id. at 650. 
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initiated as early as 1966.75 However, it was in 1985, with the 
Declaration of the Danube Countries to Cooperate on Questions 
Concerning the Water Management of the Danube, that a concerted 
effort was undertaken to develop meaningful cooperation in the field of 
environmental protection.76 Following the break up of the Soviet Union 
and the declining influence of Moscow in the region, the Danube River 
Protection Convention was signed in 1994, coming into force in 1998.77 
Despite several water disputes between nations regarding the proposed 
infrastructure projects, the member countries have displayed relative 
cohesion in working to mitigate pollution and conservation problems.78 
While much of the international cooperation has been stimulated by 
international donor organizations such as the Global Environment 
Facility, an increasing amount of responsibility to mitigate pollution and 
develop sustainable use policies is being undertaken and implemented by 
the region itself.79 Notably, the success of the environmental program for 
controlling pollution in the Danube River is in part due to its active 
inclusion of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and public 
participation.80 The experiences in the Danube basin provide an example 
of how states will undergo fairly onerous provisions for stakeholder 
provisions when there are benefits to do so.81 Moreover, despite 
considerably poor relations between the East and West in post-World 
War II Europe, the Danube Commission’s work continued uninterrupted, 
illustrating that political and environmental disagreements need not 
prove a barrier to institutional administration of a common drainage 
 75 German Federation and Czechoslovakia established local non-governmental commissions 
to address pollution and management of frontier water. See id. at 650. 
 76 The 1985 Bucharest Declaration focused on regional cooperation for pollution prevention. 
See id. at 645. 
 77 Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River, 
June 29, 1994, available at www.icpdr.org/main/icpdr/danube-river-protection-convention. 
 78 One of the most notable cases of disputes was related to the Gabčikovo Dam project 
between Slovakia and Hungry in 1998, showing that conflicts persisted even during the 
implementation of the Danube Convention. See Case Concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25, 2007), available at www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/92/7375.pdf. 
 79 Gerlak, supra note 67, at 5. Since 1991, the Global Environment Facility has granted more 
than $70 million USD. Partnership Investment Fund, led by the World Bank, on nutrient reduction in 
the basin designed to catalyse an investment response to accelerate action. An initial grant of $20 
million from GEF aims to leverage $210 million for nutrient reduction investments in agriculture, in 
the municipal and industrial wastewater treatment sector, and for wetland restoration. 
 80 This is particularly evident by the work of the Danube Environmental Forum, which was 
vital in coordinating environmental NGOs. See Alistair S. Rieu-Clarke, An Overview of Stakeholder 
Participation—What Current Practices and Future Challenges?, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L & 
POL’Y 611, 628 (2007). 
 81 Id. at 631. 
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basin.82 
III. DESIGNING APPROPRIATE INSTITUTIONS TO MEET CHANGE 
At the core of transboundary institutional arrangements are the 
agreements that outline the functions and raison d’être of the institutions. 
If the current agreements outlining how sovereign states share 
international waters are to prove effective under changing 
hydrodynamics, they will need to be sufficiently flexible to allow for 
mitigation and adaptation. At the forefront of this will be the ability to 
collectively make fundamental alterations to resource management as 
change occurs. 
Agreements regarding governance of international waters to protect 
and promote sustainable development also serve to promote security 
throughout an entire area.83 These international agreements tend to 
stabilize and enhance security at the regional level.84 The security 
generated is independent of the concrete ecological and economic 
benefits produced by such agreements. Severe deforestation, soil erosion, 
salinization, toxic contamination, resource exploitation, habitat 
destruction, drought, flooding, air pollution, and water pollution are just 
some of the environmental calamities that can lead to increased tensions 
and possible conflict over international waters.85 Conversely, the process 
of reaching accommodation creates a stabilizing and transparent 
atmosphere.86 The view that water can act as a catalyst for cooperation87 
 82 Albert Lepawsky, International Development of River Resources, 39 INT’L AFF. 533, 535 
(1963). 
 83 James Kraska, Sustainable Development Is Security: The Role of Transboundary River 
Agreements as a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) in South Asia, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 465, 466 
(2003). 
 84 Id. at 466. 
 85 “[I]nstitutions, preferably, basin-wide, integrated development institutions, may prevent 
eventually acute conflicts as they regulate behavior in shared river basins.” Kliot et al., supra note 
24, at 252; see also Richard Kyle Paisley & Glen Hearns, Some Observations from Recent 
Experiences with the Governance of International Drainage Basins, in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
SYMPOSIUM–PRECIOUS, WORTHLESS, OR INCALCULABLE: THE VALUE AND ETHIC OF WATER (A.C. 
Corrêa & Gabriel Eckstein, eds., 2006). 
 86 Developing a forum for information exchange is often an important first step toward 
creating greater transparency and confidence building. Informal exchange of information and data 
sharing are further steps not only in addressing mutual interests and concerns, but also in creating an 
atmosphere of trust and cooperation. See generally Ian Townsend-Gault, Preventive Diplomacy and 
Pro-Activity in the South China Sea, 20 COMP. SOUTHEAST ASIA 171, 182 (1998) (discussing in 
detail the use of informal processes as a means of advancing cooperation in the contested areas in the 
South China Sea). 
 87 Acts of cooperation are viewed as a range of actions and can include, e.g., public political 
statements of support or intent, exchanging information, conducting joint studies. See Wolf et al., 
supra note 30, at 34. 
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has strong support, as indicated by the burgeoning number of 
transboundary agreements and acts of cooperation.88 
The process of negotiation usually widens political participation 
building political stability and spreading confidence between sovereign 
states.89 Increased confidence can emerge even in cases in which 
countries agree only to share information and exchange data, while 
disagreeing on substantive issues.90 
While an agreement may strengthen ties, institutions must usually 
be developed to implement agreements in order to realise any benefits. 
The Mahakali Treaty between Nepal and India illustrates this point.91 
The importance of institutional development as a keystone to successful 
transboundary water management cannot be underestimated.92 Designing 
the appropriate institutional architecture to administer an agreement is a 
critical step in the effective implementation of international waters 
governance agreements. This is particularly true in the case of 
transboundary waters, where clear upstream and downstream rivalries 
 88 There is a growing number of agreements and treaties regarding transboundary water 
resource management, with approximately 450 that have been developed on all continents. 
Interestingly, about twenty percent are on the continent of Africa. See Jonathan Lautze & Mark 
Giordano, Transboundary Water Law in Africa: Development, Nature, and Geography, 45 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 1053, 1056 (2005). Consequently, many academics conclude that, overall, water has 
been a focal point for cooperation as opposed to conflict. See, e.g., Jesse H. Hamner & Aaron T. 
Wolf, Patterns in International Water Resource Treaties: The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute 
Database, 1997 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y Y.B. 157 (1998); Ashok Swain, Water Wars: 
Fact or Fiction, 33 FUTURES 769, 769-81 (2001); DAVID PHILLIPS ET AL., TRANS-BOUNDARY 
WATER CO-OPERATION AS A TOOL FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND BROADER BENEFIT SHARING 
(2006); Conflict and Cooperation, supra note 51, at 3.7; ShiraYoffe et al., Conflict and Cooperation 
over International Freshwater Resources: Indicators of Basins at Risk, 39 J. AM. WATER 
RESOURCES ASS’N 1109, 1124 (2003). 
 89 Kraska, supra note 83, at 467. 
 90 Id. at 491. 
 91 India and Nepal both signed and ratified the Mahakali Treaty in 1994, in which the 
institutions agreed to establish a joint management authority and construct the Pancheswar dam for 
hydro-power, irrigation and flood control. While the Mahakali Treaty resolved the issue of India 
using Nepalese territory to construct the Tanakpur barrage, the joint authority was never established 
and no construction of Pancheswar has been initiated. See Glen Hearns, The Mahakali River Treaty: 
Applying a New Lens to Past Efforts for Future Success, in NATURAL RESOURCES SECURITY IN 
SOUTH ASIA: NEPAL’S WATER 141, 144 (Fiona Rotberg & Ashok Swain eds., 2007), available at 
www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/2007/0710Nepal.pdf. 
 92 Mikiyasu Nakayama, Successes and Failures of International Organizations in Dealing 
with International Waters Water Resources Development, 13 INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. 367 
(1997) (U.K.); A.P. Elhance, Hydropolitics: Grounds for Despair, Reasons for Hope, 5 INT’L 
NEGOTIATION 201 (2000); Thomas Bernauer, Explaining Success and Failure in International River 
Management, 64 AQUATIC SCI. 1 (2002) (Switz.); Frank G.W. Jaspers, Institutional Arrangements 
for Integrated River Basin Management, 5 WATER POL’Y 77, 89 (2003) (U.K.); Claudia W. Sadoff 
& David Grey, Beyond the River: The Benefits of Cooperation on International Rivers, 4 WATER 
POL’Y 389, 399 (2002) (U.K.). 
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can often occur.93 The institution developed to manage resources will 
ultimately define not only “sustainable use,” but also uses that are 
reasonable and equitable and under what conditions. At the core of 
institutional architecture is the development of an understanding of the 
needs or issues driving the creation of a transboundary institution, or its 
“functional necessity.”94 Effective institutions are ones that meet social 
needs, or rather clearly address specific problems.95 Substantive 
functional necessity should therefore provide the foundational design 
behind any institutional regime developed to implement an agreement.96 
For example, the design of the institution will likely be different if the 
context for cooperation is to address the problem of an upstream state 
polluting a river, as opposed to addressing the mutual problem of flood 
control.97 
To arrive at an effective institutional mechanism for a given 
agreement, a significant degree of design, or architecture, needs to be 
present from the foundation up. Following an analysis of the context for 
institutional development is the identification of the underlying 
institutional objectives. These focus on: 
 
1. Balancing and creating new incentives for cooperation, including 
removal of a significant problem, such as flooding or pollution, and the 
 93 Promoting Cooperation, supra note 28, at 45. 
 94 The functional necessity, or “environmental problem structure”, should lead to the regime 
design and institutional structure developed through regime formation. See Bernauer, supra note 92, 
at 4. In terms of river basins, for example, functional necessity can be seen as addressing: 1. 
development of joint projects for power production or flood control—this type is dominant as it 
tends to reflect infrastructure-oriented development, as with the Rio Grande, Columbia, and Senegal 
River basins; 2. allocation of water, particularly in arid areas—for example, the Incomati and the 
Niger rivers; and 3. water quality and pollution, such as the Danube and Rhine rivers. Analysis of the 
principal focus of agreements on transboundary rivers shows that hydropower and flood control 
account for thirty-nine percent and nine percent, respectively; water supply and allocation account 
for thirty-seven percent and industrial uses and pollution account for six percent and four percent, 
respectively. See Aaron T. Wolf, Conflict and Cooperation Along International Waterways, 1 
WATER POL’Y 251, 257 (1998) (U.K.) (discussing a complete breakdown on issues addressed by 
transboundary water agreements). 
 95 Thomas Bernauer, The Effect of International Environmental Institutions: How We Might 
Learn More, 49 ENVTL. INSTITUTIONS 351, 365 (1995). 
 96 See Bernauer, supra note 92, at 2. In assessing the success and failure of institutions, 
Bernauer argues that the major obstacles to effective management of transboundary rivers are not 
technical, but rather political. Success or failure of the institution will be determined by the societal 
processes (identifying the needs being addressed) through which the institutions are designed and 
implemented. Id. 
 97 The case of an upstream state polluting a river to the detriment of a downstream state is an 
example of “asymmetric” interests that generally make it more difficult to form an effective 
institutional regime for governance. In contrast, two states suffering from flooding have a common 
goal or “symmetrical” interests, making it relatively easier to develop an effective institutional 
regime. See Bernauer, supra note 92, at 6. 
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developing new benefits such as power generation; 
 
2.  Reducing uncertainty, including knowledge around resource 
behaviour, climate change, and behaviour of the other parties to the 
agreement (increasing trust and confidence building); and 
 
3. Reducing the costs of implementation, including transactional costs 
of meetings and administration, capital costs if applicable, and 
developing the technical capacity of the parties to implement the 
agreement.98 
 
Not all the objectives are of equal significance in all situations. For 
example, the importance of reducing uncertainty of party behaviour 
between the United States and Canada in the development of the 
Columbia River Treaty was likely less acute than between India and 
Nepal when they were negotiating the Mahakali Treaty. In the former, 
the International Joint Commission, consisting of individuals from both 
countries, was created to conduct independent studies and develop 
principles for the agreement.99 In the latter, tensions were so high that 
Nepal requested the involvement of a neutral third party to help broker 
the deal and ensure an equitable arrangement.100 
Institutional objectives should dictate the final institutional 
architecture if the regime is to be effective.101 One party’s possible goal 
in entering into an international waters treaty might be sustainable 
development to alleviate poverty. This was one of Nepal’s principal 
objectives in the Karnali River project, when India build a dam in Nepal, 
and required considerable balancing of incentives in the form of 
 98 Promoting Cooperation, supra note 28, at ch. 3. 
 99 In 1944, the governments of Canada and the United States asked the International Joint 
Commission (IJC) to investigate and recommend a plan of development for the upper portions of the 
Columbia Basin. At the time, the United States produced 40.3 billion kWh per year on the Columbia, 
compared to Canada’s 2.7 billion kWh. The IJC created the International Columbia River 
Engineering Board (ICREB) to analyse use of the waters with respect to: domestic water supply, 
navigation, efficient power, flood control, reclamation, conservation of fish and wildlife, and other 
benefits. The IJC further developed sixteen principles for equitable sharing of benefits. See REPORT 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION UNITED STATES AND CANADA ON PRINCIPLES FOR 
DETERMINING AND APPORTIONING BENEFITS FROM COOPERATIVE USE OF STORAGE OF WATERS & 
ELECTRICAL INTER-CONNECTION WITHIN THE COLUMBIA RIVER SYSTEM (1959), available at 
www.crt2014-2024review.gov/Files/IJC.pdf. 
 100 Third-party involvement in the Pancheshwar dam project was critical for Nepal on two 
major accounts. The first was developing the capacity to create project assessments and negotiate 
with India as an equal in terms of knowledge of the substantial aspects of the project. These included 
calculation of the potential value of benefits accruing. The second was the third-party’s ability to act 
as a watchdog to ensure equitable sharing in developing an agreement. See Hearns, supra note 91, at 
159. 
 101 Promoting Cooperation, supra note 28, at ch. 3. 
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upstream and downstream benefit sharing.102 Likewise, developing a 
greater understanding of the resources and reducing the uncertainty 
surrounding future behaviour may also be important for sustainable 
resource use. Other institutional objectives could include increasing 
confidence between parties103 and developing an institutional framework 
that will minimize the costs of administration and implementation.104 
The institution’s effectiveness will depend on how it meets its objectives. 
If there is a great deal of uncertainty related to the size of a fish stock, for 
example, then one of the institution’s key objectives would be to reduce 
this uncertainty before equitable allocations (another objective) can be 
made. For the institution to be effective, the component of appropriately 
assessing the stock must be incorporated into the institutional 
architecture of the agreement. The Convention on the Conservation and 
Management of the Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea is an 
example of this.105 At the core of the Pollock agreement is the annual 
assessment of stocks by a multinational technical committee to calculate 
the signatories’ allowable catch for any given year.106 
In the context of climate change, reducing uncertainty aids 
understanding and predicting the substantive issues associated with the 
resource in question.107 This could translate to greater measurements or 
scientific understanding of the resource,108 while acknowledging the data 
gaps and the limitations of science in both predicting and managing the 
 102 Richard Kyle Paisley, Adversaries into Partners: International Water Law and the 
Equitable Sharing of Downstream Benefits, 3 MELB. J. INT’L L. 280, 299 (2002) (Austl.). 
 103 While building trust (or confidence) may not directly address a functional necessity, it 
does so indirectly through enhancing confidence-building structures, which allow actors to develop 
actions or mechanisms that can address functional needs such as biodiversity preservation, pollution 
control, and overfishing. Building trust among actors was one of the key objectives behind the South 
China Sea Informal Working Group’s activities for close to ten years. Although one of the 
fundamental driving forces behind the project was the resolution of the Spratly Island dispute, initial 
discussions focused on information exchange and developing and understanding legal principles. 
Over time, as confidence was built, areas of mutual concern, such as biodiversity and pollution 
control, were also addressed. See Townsend-Gault, supra note 86, at 183-187. 
 104 Promoting Cooperation, supra note 28, at 128. 
 105 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central 
Bering Sea, Feb. 11, 1994, available at 
www.afsc.noaa.gov/REFM/CBS/Docs/Convention%20on%20Conservation%20of%20Pollock%20i
n%20Central%20Bering%20Sea.pdf [hereinafter Pollock Agreement]. The Bering Sea Pollock 
Convention is an agreement to sustainably manage the Pollock resources of the “doughnut hole” in 
the Bering Sea. This is an area of international waters that has traditionally been fished by Russia, 
the United States, and distant fishing nations. The convention is based on scientific determination of 
the sustainable yield of the Pollock resource each year, to set quotas for the various nations. The 
contracting members are Russia, Poland, China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Id. 
 106 Id. at art. 9. The signatories to the Pollock agreement include the United States, China, 
Russia, South Korea, and Poland. Id. 
 107 Kundzewicz et al., supra note 6, at 7. 
 108 Id. 
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resource.109 Institutions that can behave adaptively both in terms of their 
approach to management (learning associated with the resource), and 
toward their decision-making, will be better prepared to address change 
than those that cannot. Moreover, the openness of the institution to 
developing interactions with appropriate actors, such as providing 
opportunities for learning between the parties, will enhance the ability of 
those parties to mutually and cooperatively address change. 
IV. THE NEED FOR INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS: CLIMATE-PROOFING 
AGREEMENTS 
Part of the solution for dealing with future uncertainty in the 
governance of international waters will be technical and infrastructure-
related. For example, the bulk of all water use in many countries is 
agricultural.110 Improvements are expected in the agricultural sector 
through technology, such as drip irrigation techniques and monitoring 
crop demand.111 Building storage has traditionally been a principle way 
of adapting to water insecurity. While dams have been built for the 
express purpose of energy generation, the majority of modern dams are 
either multipurpose or have been built for water supply storage to adapt 
to water scarcity.112 Retaining flexibility through strategies that employ a 
mix of infrastructure and associated institutional reforms will become 
increasingly important to deal with the uncertainties of climate change.113 
In temperate Europe, rainfall is relatively regular, and natural 
regulation of water flow occurs through lakes, groundwater storage and 
wetlands making forty percent of the runoff available for productive 
uses. In the semi-arid Iberian Peninsula, the situation is dramatically 
different, with under ten percent of runoff available through natural 
regulation.114 
 109 Data gaps will always exist in resource management. Uncertainty about systems and lack 
of data should not be excuses to postpone important management decisions. Techniques such as 
structured decisionmaking can help make the best decisions with current data. See Julien Martin et 
al., Structured Decision Making as a Conceptual Framework To Identify Thresholds for 
Conservation and Management, 19 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1079, 1089 (2009). 
 110 In 1995, the water used for irrigation represented approximately eighty percent of global 
water withdrawal and as much as eighty-six percent in developing countries. See MARK ROSEGRANT 
ET AL., INT’L FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INST., WORLD FOOD AND WATER TO 2025: DEALING WITH 
SCARCITY 1, 110 (2002). 
 111 Id. 
 112 JACQUES LESLIE, DEEP WATER: THE EPIC STRUGGLE OVER DAMS, DISPLACED PEOPLE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2005). 
 113 UNITED NATIONS ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR., supra note 31, at 78. 
 114 INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV./WORLD BANK, WATER RESOURCES SECTOR 
STRATEGY: STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS FOR WORLD BANK ENGAGEMENT 6 (2004), available at www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/06/01/000090341_20040601150257
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This difference in natural regulation has resulted in the countries of 
Spain and Portugal having 150 times more storage capacity per person 
than do their temperate neighbors such as France, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom.115 However, additional caution must be applied to dam 
building in the context of transboundary rivers, because dams will alter 
the flow of rivers affecting downstream states. 
While technical solutions will form part of the answer, flexibility 
and adaptability are best institutionalized to build resilience and respond 
to change. As noted by Thomas Bernauer, technical solutions exist for 
most water problems, but it is the institutional and political dimensions 
that generally hinder progress toward sustainable and active adaptive 
management.116 The challenge for international waters governance is 
creating institutions that adapt to change. This will require constructing 
management and decision-making structures that respond to changing 
physical conditions like increased drought or flooding. For example 
governance institutions can be established and maintained with built-in 
audit and performance evaluation requirements. 
Traditional institutional approaches to governance of international 
waters are generally challenged when trying to deal with complexities or 
uncertainties associated with episodic change such as climate change.117 
Governance systems crafted to fit one set of socio-ecological conditions 
may erode as social, economic, technological, and bio-physical changes 
occur.118 Management theory may need to abandon the perception of a 
steady state-human-environment interaction.119 Instead, “managing 
complex, co-evolving social-ecological systems for sustainability 
requires the ability to cope with, adapt to, and shape change without 
/Rendered/PDF/28114.pdf. 
 115 See id. at 6-7 (citing to MINISTRY OF ENV’T, SPAIN, LIBRO BLANCO DEL AGUA EN ESPAÑA 
(2000)). 
 116 Bernauer, supra note 92, at 2. Despite cooperation over transboundary water being usually 
more efficient from an economic standpoint than conflict, political obstacles to negotiations of 
transboundary waters continue to exist. See also Aaron T. Wolf, International Water Conflict 
Resolution: Lessons from Comparative Analysis, 13 INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. 333, 358 
(1997) (U.K.). 
 117 Traditional management assumptions: 1. there are single public sector decisionmakers; 2. 
impacts are of a manageable size; 3. values are known and static; 4. time can addressed through 
discounting methods of future costs and benefits; 5. uncertainty can by manageable; and 6. the 
system under study can be seen as linear—are not valid when addressing complexities associated 
with climate change. See M. Granger Morgan et al., Why Conventional Tools for Policy Analysis Are 
Often Inadequate for Problems of Global Change, 41 CLIMATIC CHANGE 271, 271 (1999) (Neth.). 
 118 Thomas Dietz et al., The Struggle To Govern the Commons, 302 SCI. 1907, 1907 (2003). 
 119 The assumptions that regional water balances will remain relatively stable over time must 
be abandoned, putting into question the applicability of our current governance systems. See 
Tarlock, supra note 13, at 2. 
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losing options for future development.”120 Five significant requirements 
have been identified for successful adaptive governance in complex 
systems:121 
 
1. Providing information; 
 
2. Dealing with conflict; 
 
3. Clear rules, equitable property rights, and inducing rule compliance; 
 
4. Providing infrastructure—or necessary tools—to “manage 
resource”; and 
 
5. Being prepared for change. 
 
While all five issues are needed for adapting to climate change, 
“being prepared for change” is often compromised when designing 
institutional arrangements. States are often reluctant to develop 
institutional arrangements that may be perceived as relinquishing 
sovereignty over shared resources. Being prepared for change involves 
the ability to make decisions regarding resources as change occurs. 
While this can be difficult within a national context, it is compounded by 
the complexities of transboundary jurisdiction.122 Flexibility for 
decision-making must be incorporated into institutional arrangements 
from the beginning. The degree of flexibility and how it is to be 
incorporated should be based on the resource in question from a bio-
physical pers
The following list contains examples of mechanisms that have been 
employed internationally to deal with adaptation and change in 
governance of transboundary water resources (List 1). While it is by no 
means a complete list, it serves to illustrate the variety of mechanisms 
that can be incorporated when developing adaptation capability in 
institutional arrangements for transboundary international waters 
governance.123 
 120 CARL FOLKE ET AL., RESILIENCE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: BUILDING ADAPTIVE 
CAPACITY IN A WORLD OF TRANSFORMATIONS 51 (2002). 
 121 Dietz et al., supra note 118, at 1908-09. 
 122 International waters involve numerous countries and are necessarily complex in nature, 
due to social and political conditions in addition to the aspects of resource management. See Juha I. 
Uitto & Alfred M. Duda, Management of Transboundary Water Resources: Lessons from 
International Cooperation for Conflict Prevention, 168 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 365, 376 (2002) (U.K.). 
 123 See generally UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME-GLOBAL ENV’T FACILITY, INT’L 
WATERS PROJECT, INTERNATIONAL WATERS: REVIEW OF INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS (2011), 
available at governance-iwlearn.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/International-Waters-Report-
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List 1: Examples of Mechanisms To Promote Adaptation in 
Treaties and Agreements 
 Review of treaty provisions after agreed period 
o Advantage: It provides parties with an official means of 
incorporating new concerns or reviewing effectiveness 
of a treaty. 
o Disadvantage: The longer the period between reviews, 
the less flexibility the treaty will have. Review may also 
require high-level formal approval needing greater time 
and thus making it less responsive to change. 
 Amendment to provisions of the treaty 
o Advantage: Generally, amendments can be proposed at 
any time. 
o Disadvantage: Amendments often have to be 
unanimous, or parties may often be able to make a 
reservation regarding an amendment, which can dilute 
its effect. Also, there is a high degree of formality 
associated with them. 
 Development of protocols to an existing treaty 
o Advantage: Generally, these can be done at the request 
of parties and can be at any time. They allow for 
adaptation of substantive elements of the treaty. 
o Disadvantage: Like amendments, protocols may not be 
adopted by all parties, diluting their effects. They require 
high-level formal approval that can hinder adaptation if 
rapid change is needed. 
 Development of supplementary agreements (can be temporary) 
o Advantage: These can generally be executed at the 
request of parties at any time. They may require less 
formality, as they can be of limited duration and may be 
executed at the operational level. They can respond well 
to frequent or repeated events. 
o Disadvantage: Supplementary agreements are less likely 
to be responsive to singular or extreme events, as they 
still require negotiation. 
 Incorporate graduated scale of actions based on predicted 
situations 
o Advantage: It is forward-looking and works to provide 
confidence and certainty of outcomes in potential 
White-and-Case.pdf. The following list has been developed from a study of twenty-eight 
transboundary freshwater and marine legal and institutional frameworks. Id. 
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situations. 
o Disadvantage: It may not incorporate all situations. 
 Use of Official Minutes to alter Treaty substantively 
o Advantage: This is potentially very flexible and can be 
achieved without many formalities, as decisions can be 
made through agreement of an oversight body. 
o Disadvantage: The oversight body may be limited in the 
types of decisions it can make. 
 Provide for the convening of technical groups to review issues 
under extreme events 
o Advantage: This can address the immediate concern in a 
focused way and has the potential to respond rapidly. 
o Disadvantage: It may take time to form the group. 
 Creation of management body with decision-making authority 
o Advantage: Joint management authorities can allow for 
decisions, within a specified range of issues, without the 
need for involving discussions at the higher level. They 
may respond rapidly within their jurisdiction. 
o Disadvantage: Influence and flexibility will depend on 
jurisdiction of management duties. Governments are 
often reluctant to allow joint authorities too much 
control. Joint authorities may also be expensive to run; 
however, national agencies would have to conduct the 
implementation of a treaty in any case. 
 Use of scientific body to determine resource allocations/use 
o Advantage: These bodies can apply adaptive 
management and emphasize the use of science for 
management decision-making. 
o Disadvantage: Scientific bodies may not incorporate all 
aspects of information for decision-making, leaving out 
socio-economic and political concerns. Information may 
be incomplete, lacking, or have a high degree of 
uncertainty associated with it. 
 
Understanding why flexibility may be needed will determine “how” 
it should be incorporated. In a study of thirty-five basins, Erik Mostert 
concludes that in “transboundary water agreements, the desire to develop 
and maintain good relationships [is] the most effective force behind 
reaching agreements.”124 States generally enter into agreements only 
when some form of mutual benefit is derived.125 Good relations can be 
 124 Mostert, supra note 60, at 1. 
 125 Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations, 50 
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passive in the sense that there is no significant interaction, and that each 
is left to its own management. Alternatively, good relations can be more 
active, whereby states work collaboratively to better manage shared 
resources. In the latter, good relations are a means to more substantive 
ends. 
The Nile Basin Initiative is an example of a relationship-building 
agreement: one of its goals is to help negotiate a basin-wide cooperative 
framework agreement.126 The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) is a regional 
partnership launched by Nile riparian states in 1999 to facilitate the 
common pursuit of sustainable development and management of the Nile 
basin.127 Over the past decade, the NBI has promoted water management 
and development in the basin through training courses and creation of 
eight major investment projects for which it is seeking funding.128 The 
members are Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda; Eritrea is 
involved as an observer.129 During its launching, the Nile Council of 
Ministers (Nile-COM) agreed on a Shared Vision “to achieve sustainable 
socio-economic development through the equitable utilization of and 
benefit from the common Nile Basin water resources.”130 
Another example of relationship-building is the Abidjan 
Convention, which is a framework agreement that outlines the major 
areas of focus and work, but leaves the substantive details to subsidiary 
agreements or protocols.131 The convention addresses “broad marine and 
INT’L ORG. 109 (1996). States may also enter into one agreement that may not provide obvious 
mutual gains so that advantages can be leveraged in other areas. Also, a state may be coerced into 
signing an agreement by a more powerful neighbor through hydro-hegemony. See Mark Zeitoun & 
Jeroen Warner, Hydro-Hegemony—A Framework for Analysis of Trans-Boundary Water Conflicts, 8 
WATER POL’Y 435 (2006) (U.K.); see also Grzybowski et al., supra note 28. 
 126 GOOD PRACTICES AND PORTFOLIO LEARNING IN GEF TRANSBOUNDARY FRESHWATER 
AND MARINE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS PROJECT, IN-DEPTH CASE ANALYSIS FOR 
NILE RIVER BASIN 9 (2010), available at governance-iwlearn.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/09/NILE-FORMATTED.pdf. 
 127 Id. at 4. 
 128 The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) is an inter-governmental body established to promote 
cooperation within the Nile Basin. It is headed by the Nile Council of Ministers and is administered 
through the Nile Secretariat in Entebbe. About Us, NILE BASIN INITIATIVE, 
www.nilebasin.org/newsite/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&layout=blog&id=5&Ite
mid=68&lang=en (last visited Apr. 1, 2013). 
 129 South Sudan became a member in July 2012. See South Sudan Admitted to the Nile Basin 
Initiative, NILE BASIN INITIATIVE, 
www.nilebasin.org/newsite/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&layout=blog&id=5&Ite
mid=68&lang=en (last visited Apr. 2, 2013). 
 130 The Shared Vision was announced when the Nile Basin Initiative was established on Feb. 
22, 1999. NILE BASIN INITIATIVE, supra note 128. 
 131 The Convention for the Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and 
Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region; and Protocol, Mar. 23, 1981. The 
Convention and its protocol concerning cooperating in combating pollution in cases of emergency 
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coastal issues in Western, Central and Southern Africa, setting regional 
norms and providing a platform for implementing environmental 
initiatives under NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development).”132 Contracting members of the Abidjan Convention are 
Benin, Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South 
Africa, and Togo.133 
In dealing with response to climate change, this Article focuses on 
those agreements of a more substantive nature. However, regardless of 
whether an agreement is of a substantive or relationship-building nature, 
developing flexibility can be a catalyst for cooperation. States are more 
likely to enter into a cooperative arrangement if they know there are 
built-in possibilities to change either the substantive elements or the 
procedural aspects of the agreement to meet new needs.134 
Moreover, procedural issues, such as a review of the agreement or 
the development of new protocols, are also important mechanisms to 
deal with uncertainty in future situations. Most substantive agreements 
will have provisions dealing with periodic reviews. For example, Article 
12 of the Mahakali Treaty requires a review every ten years or “earlier as 
required by either party.”135 Another example would be the Farakka 
Agreement’s five-year review period.136 
Many agreements, such as the Columbia River Treaty137 and the 
Mekong Agreement,138 do not provide for specific review periods. The 
came into force in Aug. 5, 1984. See The Convention, ABIDJAN CONVENTION SECRETARIAT, 
abidjanconvention.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46&Itemid=103 (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2013). The Convention Protocol and other articles are available on the webpage. See 
id. 
 132 GOOD PRACTICES AND PORTFOLIO LEARNING IN GEF TRANSBOUNDARY FRESHWATER 
AND MARINE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS PROJECT, IN-DEPTH CASE STUDY OF THE 
GUINEA CURRENT LARGE MARINE ECOSYSTEM 4 (2012), available at governance-iwlearn.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/GCLME.pdf. 
 133 The Contracting Parties, ABIDJAN CONVENTION SECRETARIAT, 
abidjanconvention.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=49&Itemid=138 (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2013). Other states in the process of ratifying the Abidjan Convention are Angola, 
Cape Verde, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Namibia, and Sao Tome & 
Principe. Id. 
 134 Promoting Cooperation, supra note 28, at 89. 
 135 Treaty Between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and the Government of India 
Concerning the Integrated Development of the Mahakali River Including the Sarada Barrage, 
Tanakpur Barrage and Pancheshwar Project, India-Nepal, Feb. 12, 1996, available at 
www.ecolex.org/server2.php/libcat/docs/TRE/Bilateral/Other/bi-17432.pdf. 
 136 Sharing of the Ganga/Ganges Treaty, supra note 41, at art. X. 
 137 Treaty Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Resources of the Columbia 
River Basin, U.S.-Can., opened for signature Jan. 17, 1961, 542 U.N.T.S. 244, [hereinafter Columbia 
River Treaty-CRT]. 
 138 Agreement on Co-operation for Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, 
Apr. 5, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 864 (1995). 
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Mekong Agreement provides opportunities for updating and altering the 
Agreement at any time through amendments that are agreed to by all 
parties.139 In the case of the Bay of Bengal Programme, an inter-
governmental organization on coastal fisheries, amendments to the 
agreement require a three-quarters quorum of member states on the 
governing council.140 Alterations or additions to the Barcelona 
Convention require support of three quarters of a diplomatic conference, 
which must be convened with no less than two thirds of the member 
states.141 Considering that most agreements take years, or even decades, 
to develop, treaty amendments are not an effective way to meet situations 
associated with climate change, unless they are changes that occur on the 
scale of decades.142 
Another formal method for adapting a treaty to changing situations 
is through the development of protocols.143 The Barcelona Convention 
 139 Agreement on Co-operation for Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, art. 
37, Apr. 5, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 864 (1995). 
 140 Good Practices and Portfolio Learning in GEF Transboundary Freshwater and Marine 
Legal and Institutional Frameworks, Bay of Bengal, 
199.180.129.170/watergov/index.php/Bay_of_Bengal (last visited on Apr. 2, 2013). “The 
Agreement on the Institutionalisation of the Bay of Bengal Programme as an Inter-Governmental 
Organisation (‘Agreement’) was signed on [April 26, 2003] in Chennai, India (with the Maldives 
signing the Agreement on [May 21, 2003]).” Id. The Agreement aims to enhance cooperation among 
the Member States, as well as with other countries and organizations in the region, and to provide 
technical and managerial support for the development and management of sustainable coastal 
fisheries in the Bay of Bengal region. Members are Bangladesh, India, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka. 
There have also been discussions for other countries in the Bay of Bengal region (such as Myanmar, 
Thailand, and Indonesia) to join. See id. 
 141 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the 
Mediterranean, art. 16, adopted Feb. 16, 1976 (entered into force Feb. 12, 1978), amended June 10, 
1995 (entered into force July 9, 2004), available at 
195.97.36.231/dbases/webdocs/BCP/bc95_Eng_p.pdf [hereinafter Barcelona Convention, as 
amended]. The convention focuses on integration of environmental priorities and economic 
development in national policy; assessment, prevention, and elimination of pollution; conservation 
of nature, landscapes, and sites of ecological or cultural value; and broadening both public awareness 
of threats to the Mediterranean and public participation in conservation and remedial measures. Id. 
 142 See Promoting Cooperation, supra note 28, at 171, tbl. 3.14. Treaty development can be a 
relatively slow process. The Treaty Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Resources of 
the Columbia River Basin took almost twenty years to negotiate (1945-1964); Agreement on the 
Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin took ten years to negotiate 
(1985-1995); Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable use of the Danube River 
took an nearly ten years to negotiate (1985-1994); the Treaty Between His Majesty’s Government of 
Nepal and the Government of India Concerning the Integrated Development of the Mahakali River 
Including the Sarada Barrage, Tanakpur Barrage and Pancheshwar Project took eighteen years, and 
Article 40, Annex III, of the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, took an 
estimated five years to negotiate. Id. 
 143 See generally PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed. 1997); see also PHILIPPE SANDS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (3d ed. 2012). 
26
Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol6/iss2/5
2013] TRANSBOUNDARY WATERS AGREEMENTS 285 
 
and the Caspian Sea Convention144 are both framework conventions that 
rely on the development of protocols to implement substantive issues. 
Adopting a protocols to the Barcelona Convention requires a two-thirds 
vote from among its member states.145 In many treaties or conventions, 
such as the Barcelona Convention, parties have the opportunity not to 
sign onto a specific protocol, making the process of developing protocols 
slightly more flexible than amendments to treaties.146 However, this is 
not always the case. For example, under the Caspian Sea Convention, 
protocols must be adopted by unanimous decision of all parties.147 
Despite this, two protocols regarding pollution control have been 
developed and specify greater detail as to what substantive work is to be 
done and by whom.148 Protocols, while potentially less cumbersome than 
treaty amendments, still require high levels of formality and may be an 
impediment to adaptation unless applied to long-term changes.149 
Less formal than protocols may be the establishment of 
supplementary agreements, as in the case of the Columbia River 
Treaty.150 Since the Treaty was established in 1964, various agreements 
have been made between Canada and the United States to deal with 
 144 Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea 
1-12, Nov. 4, 2003, (entered into force Aug. 12, 2006), 44 I.L.M.1 (2005), available at 
www.jstor.org/stable/20694518. The convention promotes cooperation amongst the Caspian Sea 
nations for the protection of the environment including fisheries and ecosystems. The substantive 
actions are addressed under protocols. Contracting members are Azerbaijan, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Turkmenistan. Id. 
 145 Barcelona Convention, as amended, supra note 141, at art. 15. Six protocols have been 
developed for pollution caused by dumping, oil spills, land based sources, ships in cases of 
emergency, the development of special protected areas, and integrated coastal zone management. 
Contracting parties include Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, the European 
Community, Croatia, Egypt, Spain, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, 
Monaco, Montenegro, Slovenia, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. Id. 
 146 Id. at art. 23. 
 147 Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea, 
supra note 144, at art. 24. 
 148 See, e.g., The Protocol Concerning Regional Preparedness, Response and Co-operation in 
Combating Oil Pollution Incidents to the Framework Convention on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the Caspian, opened for signature Aug. 12, 2011 (adopted and signed at the Third 
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP3) in Aktau, Kazakhstan), available at 
www.ecolex.org/server2.php/libcat/docs/TRE/Multilateral/En/TRE157714.pdf; The Protocol for the 
Protection of the Caspian Sea Against Pollution from Land-based Sources and Activities, Dec. 12, 
2012, available at 
www.tehranconvention.org/IMG/pdf/Protocol_on_Pollution_from_Land_Based_Sources_and_Activ
ities.pdf. 
 149 Alan E. Boyle, Saving the World? Implementation and Enforcement of International 
Environmental Law Through International Institutions, 3 J. ENVTL. L. 229, 238 (1991) (U.K.). 
 150 GLEN HEARNS, THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY: A SYNOPSIS OF STRUCTURE, CONTENT, 
AND OPERATIONS 22 (2008), available at 
www.ccrf.ca/uploads/Hearns_CRT_Structure_and_Content_Finalrev_20091207.pdf. 
27
Hearns and Paisley: Transboundary Waters Agreements
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013
286 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J. [Vol. 6 
 
issues as they arise.151 Many environmental and social concerns, 
increasingly important in the last twenty years, were not at the forefront 
during treaty negotiations. Supplementary agreements that fill this gap 
between original intent and new concerns, or temporary concerns, have 
the benefit of “use as needed,” such as the supplementary non-power 
uses agreements for rainbow trout and whitefish spawning.152 Under the 
Columbia River Treaty, the supplementary agreements can be conducted 
between the entities, which are the power utilities operating the storage 
facilities.153 As they are power utilities and corporations, they are able to 
modify the treaty over time without the formality of protocols. Because 
these agreements may be of a limited duration, they provide less risk for 
the governments than if they were to fundamentally alter the treaty. 
Some of the supplementary agreements have become formalized after 
being proved in the field.154 The use of these types of short-term 
agreements provides a flexible response on a shorter time frame due to 
their informality. 
Many institutional mechanisms have flexibility regarding 
substantive issues built into the agreement for unforeseen climatic events 
or uncertainty. Transboundary fresh water agreements often describe and 
determine allocations under low-flow levels. An example is the Komati 
River Agreement.155 Article 4.1 of the agreement allocates different 
quantities of waters to Swaziland and South Africa, depending upon high 
 151 Within the framework of the Columbia River Treaty, the parties may agree to a flow that 
deviates from the flow prescribed under the Treaty, providing it is mutually beneficial to do so. Both 
nations have applied this and have developed supplementary agreements, referred to as the non-
power uses agreements. See Columbia River Treaty-CRT, supra note 137, at art. XIV(2)(k). 
 152 Agreements have been developed to reduce flows from Canadian storage facilities 
between January 1 and March 31 to reduce the possibility of Mountain Whitefish eggs being flushed 
downstream. Conversely, agreements have been made to increase flows between April 1 and June 30 
to ensure sufficient flows for rainbow trout spawning. See GLEN HEARNS, ENVIRONMENTAL 
DISCUSSION PAPER, COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVIEW 10 (Nov. 2012), available at 
blog.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/files/2012/07/CRT-Environmental-Discussion-Paper_-
Revised1.pdf. 
 153 Columbia River Treaty-CRT, supra note 137, at art. XIV. The entities to the Columbia 
River Treaty are BC Hydro for Canada, and Bonneville Power Authority, and the Army Corps of 
Engineers for the United States. The entities can forgo diplomatic formalities when making decisions 
regarding alterations in reservoir levels for flow or flood protection. 
 154 See HEARNS, supra note 150, at 24. An example of this is the Columbia River Treaty 
Entity Agreement on Operation of Treaty Storage for Non-power Uses for January 1 through July 31 
(Non-Power Uses Agreements). Id. 
 155 Agreement on the Development and Utilization of the Water Resources of the Komati 
River Basin between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the 
Kingdom of Swaziland, Oct. 7, 1992, available at 
www.kobwa.co.za/index.cfm?objectid=F94F0F82-E0C4-BB9D-74C535BB1E2E23FA. The treaty is 
between South Africa and Swaziland and paved the way for the Komati River Basin Development 
Project to jointly develop the resources of the River. Id. 
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or low assurances.156 This style of allocation mechanism is considered 
relatively benign regarding the risks of climate change, as each party 
shares the surplus or deficits in a pre-determined way.157 
The Farakka Agreement, which determines the level of flows in the 
Ganges River at the Farakka Barrage, demonstrates a more detailed and 
graduated method of prescribing resource allocation of water under 
varying situations.158 The barrage, a kind of dam, constructed in 1975, 
diverts water from the Ganges into the Hooghly River to supply water for 
navigational use in Calcutta. First, the allocations are based on seventy-
five percent of the mean annual flow measured between 1949 and 
1988.159 This immediately allows for some buffering in terms of 
variation in the hydraulic regime. The schedule to the Agreement details 
allocations to both India and Bangladesh for ten periods between January 
1 and May 1, and these allocations are reduced in proportion to the flow, 
should it fall below these levels. However, the portion allocated to 
Bangladesh should not fall below eighty percent of its average allocation. 
If the flow of the Ganges falls below a specified level, Article 2(iii) of 
the Schedule mandates “immediate consultations to make adjustments on 
an emergency basis, in accordance with the principles of equity, fair play 
and no harm to either party.”160 However, it is not clear how 
consultations are to take place, or whether they are be done through 
recommendations of the Joint Commission that was set up to oversee the 
Treaty implementation. Nevertheless, there is a mechanism to prescribe 
allocations in extreme conditions. 
Negotiating or determining resource allocations in extreme 
conditions through a technical body is used in other agreements. The 
1956 Agreement on the Nile between Sudan and Egypt has an approach 
similar to that of the Farakka Agreement in the use of a negotiated 
agreement to determine new allocations under extreme conditions.161 
Unlike the Farakka Agreement, there is no buffer for climatic alterations 
as the “full” flow of the Nile is allocated between the countries. There is, 
however, greater certainty of what is to occur under extreme conditions, 
in which event a permanent Joint Technical Committee would take up 
the determination of fair allocations.162 
 156 Id. at art. 4.1. 
 157 Draper & Kundell, supra note 17, at 410. 
 158 Sharing of the Ganga/Ganges Treaty, supra note 41, at Annex II. 
 159 Id. at art. 2, Annex II. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Agreement between the United Arab Republic and the Republic of Sudan for the Full 
Utilization of the Nile Waters, U.A. Rep.–Sudan, Nov. 8, 1959, 6519 U.N.T.S. 63. 
 162 Id. at art. 4(1)e. No mention is made of what parameters are to be taken into consideration 
when determining what constitutes a fair allocation of water between them. Id. 
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Perhaps one of the most dynamic systems for altering an agreement 
is found in the Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico 
relating to the utilization of the Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana 
Rivers and of the Rio Grande.163 Here, the Agreement is extremely 
flexible in that the overarching accord can be modified and updated by 
allowing for significant decisions to be made by the International 
Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) through the creation of 
Minutes, which have legal standing.164 In this way, modifications, both 
socio-political, as well as in terms of climate change and the 
environment, can be incorporated as needed. Significant decisions can 
thus reflect current and contemporary values while fundamentally 
maintaining the spirit and intent of the original accord. For example, 
Minutes have been used to adjust water allocations, as well as to address 
salinity issues that have arisen since the signing of the Treaty in 1944. 
Recently, they have been used to adjust the set delivery schedules of 
water allocated to Mexico due to infrastructure damage associated with 
an earthquake in April 2010.165 The ability of the IBWC to adapt, amend, 
and extend the institutional arrangement between Mexico and the United 
States is a powerful tool to develop a resilient form of cooperation. The 
IBWC employs a number of technical committees to help plan and 
determine information needs for the commission to make its decisions.166 
The use of technical committees to make informed 
recommendations to deal with ongoing resource change, as well as to 
address climate change, is well established in numerous other treaties.167 
 163 Joint work conducted between the parties requires decisions or recommendations in the 
form of Minutes that are binding on the governments once approved by the heads of the International 
Boundary Water Commission. See Richard Kyle Paisley et al., Transboundary Water Management: 
An Institutional Comparison Among Canada, the United States and Mexico, 9 OCEAN & COASTAL 
L. J. 177, 189 (2004). 
 164 See Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico relating to the utilization of 
the Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., art. 25, Feb. 3, 
1944, 59 Stat. 1219. 
 165 Int’l Boundary and Water Comm’n, Adjustment of Delivery Schedules for Water Allotted 
to Mexico for the Years 2010 Through 2013 as a Result of Infrastructure Damage in Irrigation 
District 014, Rio Colorado, Caused by the April 2010 Earthquake in the Mexicali Valley, Baja 
California, Minute 318 (Dec. 17, 2010), available at 
www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/Min_318.pdf. 
 166 Christopher Brown, Transboundary Water Resource Issues on the US-Mexico Border, 
VERTIGO, HORS-SÉRIE 
2, at 7 (2005) (Can.), available at vertigo.revues.org/1883. 
 167 See, e.g., Convention on the Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika, June 12, 2003, 
available at lta.iwlearn.org/documents/the-convention-on-the-sustainable-management-of-lake-
tanganyika-eng.pdf/view; Agreement Revising the Agreement Concerning the Niger River 
Commission and the Navigation and Transport on the River Niger of 25 November 1964, art. 8, June 
15, 1973, 1346 T. S. I-22674, available at 
treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201346/volume-1346-I-22674-English.pdf; see also 
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Scientific determination of allocations on an annual level is less common 
but provides the opportunity to implement adaptive approaches, as 
opposed to prescriptive ones, when the resource in question changes. An 
example is the Convention on the Conservation and Management of 
Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea, where science and adaptive 
management drives decisions prior to any “extreme event.”168 The goal 
of the Convention is to maintain the pollock fish resources at maximum 
sustainable yield, and thus technical assessments, combined with 
modeling, help to determine allocations for marine resources.169 The 
Convention has been ratified by the United States and Russia (the littoral 
states) and China, Korea, Japan, and Poland (distant fishing nations).170 
There is an annual conference of the parties to determine the allowable 
harvest levels for the succeeding year, based on the findings of a multi-
national Technical and Scientific Committee that assesses stock 
availability.171 The fact finding and research on which to base the 
“scientific” assessment is conducted cooperatively through information 
exchange and standardizing methodologies.172 As conservation of the 
stock is essential for obtaining “maximum sustainable yield,” and thus a 
maximum sustained benefit, it is in the interests of the parties to adhere 
to the scientific findings. Due to low stock levels in the early 1990s, a 
moratorium on fishing in the “donut hole” of the Bearing Seas was 
established and has been in effect ever since.173 While the recovery of the 
Pollock stock is very slow, it is a testament to the Convention’s 
adaptability that for over fifteen years the Annual Conference of Parties 
has heeded the recommendations of the scientific community and 
maintained the moratorium on fishing.174 
In a similar vein, the Columbia River Treaty has flexibility of 
operations built into the cooperative management mechanisms of a series 
of dams on the Columbia River.175 The Treaty was entered into to 
provide flood control and power generation benefits on the river, which 
flows from Canada into the United States, by building and operating a 
series of dams in Canada to maximize generation capacity in the United 
Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses to The Treaty of the Southern African Development 
Community  art. 5(1), Aug. 14, 2001, available at 
www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/Revised-SADC-SharedWatercourse-
Protocol-2000.pdf. 
 168 Pollock Agreement, supra note 105. 
 169 Id. at art II. 
 170 See Pollock Agreement, supra note 105. 
 171 Id. at art III. 
 172 Id. at art X. 
 173 Id. at 3. 
 174 Id. 
 175 HEARNS, supra note 150, at 27. 
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States.176 The Treaty outlines the principles by which the system should 
be operated and establishes a coordinating unit through the appointment 
of “entities,” as opposed to government agencies.177 The entities are 
leaders in hydro development and work very closely to coordinate 
operations of their respective dam facilities. Thus, the system is operated 
from a basin perspective to optimize benefits. 
Variations in flows to accommodate changing conditions and 
interests can come about in a variety of ways. The Assured Operating 
Plan (AOP) laid out under the Columbia River Treaty determines flow 
five years in advance, based on current inflows.178 It is the foundation for 
operational management; however, it can be deviated from by mutual 
agreement, and for mutual benefit. Each year the Detailed Operating Plan 
(DOP) is developed, based on the AOP, but specific to expected flow 
activity and needs of the year.179 The DOP serves to develop more 
advantageous operations and has included alterations to flows that are 
not related to either hydro-power or flood control.180 More detailed 
alterations can occur during the establishment of treaty storage 
regulations for the individual dams, as well as through weekly 
coordinating meetings.181 
V. THE WAY FORWARD 
It is often difficult to shift strategies once they are initiated. This is 
particularly true for infrastructure. For example, populations protected by 
levee systems are often economically, socially, and politically difficult to 
move even if the levees become technically inadequate for dealing with 
river flows. As a result, selecting water management pathways that are 
resilient under the uncertainty of climate change is important from the 
start.182 This is no less important for legal arrangements, some of which 
have taken decades to negotiate and may be difficult or awkward to 
alter.183 The goal of developing flexible and resilient institutional 
arrangements will demand a thoughtful analysis of the resource in 
question, the potential impact of climate change, the political context 
 176 Id. at 1. See also Columbia River Treaty-CRT, supra note 137, at arts. II, III and IV. 
 177 Columbia River Treaty-CRT, supra note 137, at art. XIV. 
 178 Id. at Annex A, Principles of Operation. 
 179 HEARNS, supra note 150, at 20. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 UNITED NATIONS ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR., supra note 31, at 36. 
 183 See HEARNS, supra note 150, at 6. Canada and the United States requested that the 
International Joint Commission establish a technical committee and recommend a plan for the 
development of the Columbia Basin in 1944, some twenty years before the Columbia River Treaty 
was ratified. Id. 
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between the parties and within countries, and the capacity of the parties 
to adapt, both technically and institutionally. 
If institutional arrangements are to be adaptive, they must be 
designed from the outset to balance formal and political decision-making 
with more technical and operational management components. 
Fundamental to achieving this balance will be an assessment of the 
resource in question, including a determination of the time scale for 
change. In the case of surface water, there are generally clear seasonal 
variations in most rivers that reflect more or less consistent inter-annual 
variations. However, hydrological changes can also occur on a daily 
basis due to precipitation or snowmelt, as well as overall alterations of 
seasonal trends that may occur over periods of decades.184 
Once the various scales of change of the resource have been 
established, the level of decision-making that should occur to deal with 
the specific change can be determined. In the operation of the Columbia 
River Treaty, weekly alterations to the flow regime are determined by the 
entities through a weekly “conference call” in response to unforeseen 
developments.185 Monthly alterations to address seasonal changes in 
inflow, snow pack, and flood forecasting are conducted through treaty 
storage regulation, which is also determined by the dam operators as part 
of the operating procedures under the Treaty.186 Seasonal variations on 
an annual level can also be accommodated through the development of 
an annual Detailed Operating Plan that can deviate from the prescribed 
or assured flow through mutual agreement of the entities operating the 
dam facilities.187 This level of flexibility in operating a dynamic system 
such as a river was incorporated in the original agreement such that there 
is no need to make any treaty alterations or protocols that demand 
decision-making at the national level. Rather, national interests are 
served though a permanent engineers’ board to provide an independent 
review of the entities operating the dam facilities.188 The flexibility in 
decision-making that exists in the Columbia River Treaty is not the norm 
 184 Analysis of water levels on the Coldwater River in British Columbia shows that the 
average commencement of the spring freshet between 1985 and 2003 was about twenty days earlier 
than it had been between 1965 and 1985. See TODD HATFIELD NICOLA, RIVER WATERSHED—
WATER USE MANAGEMENT PLAN INSTREAM FLOW NEEDS FOR FISH 11, at app. A (2006), available 
at www.nwcrt.org/downloads/Hatfield-2006-Nicolainstreamflowsforfish.pdf. While this is a smaller 
river entirely within Canada, it shows that there are decadal trends in river systems that need to be 
accounted for in agreements dealing with rivers. This is especially necessary if specific seasonal 
water allocations are set into the agreement with dates. 
 185 HEARNS, supra note 150, at 20. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id.; see also Columbia River Treaty-CRT, supra note 137, at art. XIV(2)(k). 
 188 HEARNS, supra note 150, at 18; see also Columbia River Treaty-CRT, supra note 137, at 
art. XV. 
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for most international river agreements. However, even when flexibility 
is not as dynamic as in the Columbia River Treaty, it can be prescribed 
as in the case of the Farakka Barrage, where the levels of diversion 
between India and Bangladesh change according to the actual water in 
the river. 
In ensuring that international waters governance agreements are 
able to meet challenges associated with climate change, and indeed 
changes in general, consideration should be given to the list of tools 
discussed in Part IV when developing new, or adapting existing, 
institutional governance arrangements. In designing institutional 
governance arrangements, a balance must be struck that addresses the 
functional needs of managing a shared resource on the one hand with the 
political and national interests on the other hand. If institutional 
arrangements are made to be overly adaptive and flexible, this can 
compromise the degree of political certainty that may be necessary. 
Certainty is not only important from a political standpoint, but also 
founded in the socio-economic needs of the resource users. Fresh water 
and marine resources provide economic benefits to parties that may 
provide important social and economic drivers for a nation. Take the Nile 
River in Egypt for example, which provides some ninety-seven percent 
of the water resources to Egypt, ninety-five percent of which originate 
outside Egypt’s border.189 An increase in the degree of certainty in the 
quantity of resources available each year makes economic planning that 
much more confident. Consequently, the desire for rigidity in 
arrangements or set quotas has its basis in socio-economic interests as 
well as political. 
We are increasingly reminded that resources do not behave in a 
regular manner. There is increasing need to make rapid decisions 
regarding resource use, and to apply adaptive management techniques 
and decision-making. While adaptive management techniques are 
challenging to apply even within a single jurisdiction, they are even more 
difficult to apply inter-jurisdictionally. The multinational technical 
commission to assess Pollock resources in the Bering Sea is admirable in 
employing an adaptive management approach that mitigates the effects 
of climate change and other perturbations in the fish stock on a yearly 
basis. Similarly, the International Boundary and Water Commission of 
the Colorado and Rio Grande (Rio Bravo) rivers illustrates a high level 
flexibility in decision-making through the use of minutes as a way of 
updating obligations under the 1944 Colorado and Rio Grande 
agreement. In some circumstances only by a yielding of greater levels of 
 189 Peter H. Gleick, Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security, 
18 INT’L SEC. 79, 86 (1993). 
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sovereignty to an independent joint management body will successful 
adaptive management be achieved at the international level. While India 
and Nepal were negotiating the development and benefit sharing under 
the Mahakali Treaty, Nepal was eager to create an entity called the 
Pancheshwar Development Authority (PDA) to be independent of 
governments, with the goal to run the dam to maximize benefits and 
reduce operational costs.190 The PDA was to be legal entity with 
borrowing capabilities and decision-making authority.191 A relatively 
successful integration of joint authority can be found in the Senegal 
River where the Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du fleuve 
Sénégal (OMVS-Senegal River Development Organization) controls and 
operates dams along the Senegal River for the benefit of all riparians.192 
The OMVS is a legal entity allowed to apply for loans, acquire property, 
and be a party in legal proceedings.193 
Ultimately, the effectiveness of the institutional arrangement to 
adapt to change will depend not only on the mechanisms to create 
flexibility, but also the political commitment to successfully follow 
through and implement. For example, it is questionable if the PDA 
would really have operated as an independent entity. As seen from the 
example of the Farakka Barrage, Bangladesh often has complaints 
regarding the Indian operations at the barrage that have nothing to do 
with the established mechanisms under the agreement, but rather with the 
apparent lack of willingness of India to abide by them. 
Likewise in 2002, when the International Commission for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas was determining allocations for the 
various nations, the overall amount allocated (total allowable catch) was 
significantly in excess of what was recommended by the scientific panel 
responsible for determining the sustainable yield.194 When political 
interests outweigh technical and scientific knowledge at key decision 
points, successful implementation will usually be undermined. As most 
obstacles to international water management are not technical, but 
political,195 it will be important to develop agreements over resources 
 190 Promoting Cooperation, supra note 28, at 262. 
 191 Id. at 237. 
 192 See Convention Creating the Organization for the Development of the Senegal River, 
Guinea-Mali.-Mauritania-Sen., May 11, 1972, available at 
www.tematea.org/?q=node/6578&PHPSESSID=8158061ce856872aeabe2b109d4aaf0c. The OMVS 
was established in 1972 for the cooperative development of the resources of the Senegal River. The 
initial member countries were Mali, Senegal, and Mauritania. Guinea is now part to the agreement as 
well. Id. 
 193 Id. at art. 1 (3). 
 194 ANTHONY COX, QUOTA ALLOCATION IN INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES (OECD FOOD, 
AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES PAPERS NO. 22) 2, 16 (2009). 
 195 Bernauer, supra note 92, at 2. 
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